1. Introduction
It is in our nature to look back at the origins of every topic to be studied and, following the customary philosophical - historical inquiry, we return over and over again to the Pre-Socratics with the hope of moving forward to elucidate the fundaments of current philosophy. The original texts of the Pre-Socratics are scarce because only a few fragments of thought have surpassed the erosion of time being uncovered, chiefly, from verbatim sources. We cannot be certain whether their meaning can ever be entirely restored, but our desire to grasp current philosophical matters forces us back to the very beginning.[1] At this moment in time, we can acknowledge the existence of a gap between the current thought and the Pre-Socratics. The basic and perennial questions posed by them seem distant looking through the scope of identifying peculiarities of our philosophical times. This gap is due to the advancements made in philosophy during the time, which caused detachment from the origins, and today.[2] I understand advancement in a twofold way: 1) positive evolution of thought, in the sense that we are able to access more knowledge and thus develop more encompassing judgments, and 2) positive evolution of philosophy, but to the extent of detaching ourselves from its origins, because of the multiple ramifications from the original thought. Realizing these two facts, we need to redirect our attention towards the Pre-Socratics for two reasons: 1) to reconnect with the origins, and 2) to attempt re-interpretation of the Pre-Socratics, relying on our current progress in science and philosophy and, therefore, to hope for a better understanding of them. By progress, in this context, I refer to some particular scientific discoveries in the field of archaeology, history and philology on one hand, and on the other hand, philosophical, from the reconsideration of the hermeneutical methods to the realization of understanding through the scope of phenomenology.[3] Via these advancements, we can reattempt to understand the Pre-Socratics in a more thorough way. A rather severe problem arises when we try to understand the philosophical texts of Heraclitus, because we do not posses any original texts and the verbatim sources might have corrupted (by being filtered through the human consciousness) the original meaning of Heraclitus.[4] With these limitations acknowledged, we are handed down the primary interpretation of Heraclitus as given by Plato and Aristotle. This interpretation summarizes the theory of constant change and it can be tracked ultimately in Plato’s Cratylus.[5] This interpretation became traditional, and although it is inadequate in certain respects, remains dominant.[6] Alternatively to this traditional interpretation, The Heidegger-Fink Seminar on Heraclitus [7] approaches the Heraclitus’ fragments and advances additional interpretations. Heidegger’s and respectively, Fink’s interpretation of the Heraclitus’ fragments are not entirely similar, nevertheless they analogous by the rejection of traditional interpretation, i.e. Plato’s interpretation, which is considered to be the standard view. The purpose of this essay is not to emphasize the conspicuous dissimilarities between the traditional understanding of Heraclitus and the Heidegger’s-Fink’s understanding, but rather to establish if these two approaches can stand at the same time.[8] Particularly, I will attempt to re-analyze the manner in which Heraclitus believes that understanding of the universe takes place (as seen in the Seminar) and then a comparison to the standard view will be possible.
Initially, I will try to outline the major themes in Heraclitus: from the traditional interpretation’s point of view, emphasizing the aspects concerned with understanding, and then we will analyze the same aspects of Heraclitus’ philosophy but from the more actual perspective, concluding with an brief analysis of the relationship established between the two approaches.
1. The traditional interpretation
The traditional approach focuses on Heraclitus in a twofold way: firstly, it attempts to provide some biographical information on Heraclitus and secondly it renders the standard view of Heraclitus philosophy, being generally directed towards the idea of flux, unity of the opposites, logos and the path to understanding. I will follow, very restrictively, some of the capital features of Heraclitean philosophy, through the scope of traditional interpretation. These major themes of Heraclitus’ philosophy are usually investigated antithetically or be being compared with ideas of other philosophers. Although, inscribed in the group of the Pre-Socratics, Heraclitus overcomes his cosmologically-centred forerunners, the Milesians, founding a much more encompassing philosophy, which is not solely concerned with cosmology or ontology, but also integrating ethical and epistemological issues. Despite the scarcity of biographical sources, Heraclitus portrait is unique among other Pre-Socratics. Unlike his forerunners, Heraclitus is not a public or charismatic persona, contrariwise, indications of his misanthropy are conspicuously inserted throughout his work. He seems to have led a secluded life, feeling contemptuously for his fellow citizens[9], or other philosophers. His unfriendliness and misanthropy[10] gained him the nickname “The Weeping Philosopher”[11].
“Much learning does not teach insight. Otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and moreover Xenophanes and Hecataeus.”[12]
“Heraclitus said that Homer deserved to be expelled from the contests and flogged, and Archilochus likewise.”[13]
Or regarding his fellow citizens:
“The best renounce all for one thing, the eternal fame of mortals, but the many stuff themselves like cattle.”[14]
“They are at odds with the logos, with which above all they are in continuous contact, and the things they meet every day appear strange to them.”[15]
“What understanding or intelligence have they? They put their trust in popular bards and take the mob for their teacher, unaware that most people are bad, and few are good.”[16]
Regardless of his inclination for seclusion and contemptuous attitude towards society, Heraclitus’ thought was not solely an isolated moment in time. Moreover, he establishes the path for all subsequent philosophy, exercising paramount influence upon his followers. He may be not easy to understand, for all his thought is epigrammatically rendered into rather obscure and difficult to access riddles, - for these reasons he has been called dark or obscure[17] himself -, but his philosophy has been at all times esteemed.[18],[19] The standard view of Heraclitus' ontology since Aristotle is that he is a material monist who holds that fire is the ultimate reality; all things are just manifestations of fire. According to Aristotle the Milesians in general were material monists who advocated other kinds of ultimate matter: Thales water, Anaximander the boundless, Anaximenes air (Metaphysics 983b6-984a8).[20] His major philosophical principle states that everything is in flux. This argument is also known as the pantha rhei argument, which is conveyed to us by Simplicius. However, Plato is the earliest known philosopher to cite from Heraclitus on this account, in Cratylus[21]:
“Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.”[22]
This citation is considered the fundament of the traditional interpretation of Heraclitus. Also, traditionally, Heraclitus is contrasted to Parmenides, who states that only doxologically things appear to be in flux, but upon the way of truth there is no coming into being, nor ceasing to be. Things are or they are not. Another leading idea found in Heraclitus and traditionally tackled refers to the convergence of opposite attributes, or principles:
"Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one."[23]
"Things taken together are whole and not whole, [something which is] being brought together and brought apart, in tune and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity; and out of a unity all things."[24]
Of more particular interest here is the manner in which Heraclitus conceives understanding, and traditionally, there are several themes or key words connected to this issue. For, although obscure, Heraclitus’ philosophy is besprinkled with suggestions of how to reach a higher understanding. Therefore, the standard view is concerned with identifying the meaning of the following themes: Logos, wisdom and ignorance, listening and seeing and relativity.
The word Logos is the earmark of Heraclitus’ philosophy. He uses it in order to denote the underlying unity in the apparent diversity and change in the world.[25] The nature of this Logos is contested. Some scholars understand it as the nature or essence of reality, as it shows itself in discourse, others as a universal principle or law that regulates the basic workings of reality, and a few render it as Heraclitus’s true account of reality in the form of his own book, or Logos. With his predilection for wordplay, Heraclitus could well allow Logos to stand for both his book and the subject of his book.[26] Other closer meanings are thought, reason, ground, etc. Drew Hyland establishes that Logos is the intelligible law of the Universe.[27] Dennis Sweet’s belief is not dissimilar and, in extension, he connects etymologically Logos to the verb lego (legein, “to say”) in order to establish the oral character of Logos, i.e. spoken word, statement, and discourse. Under these considerations, Logos appears to be the structural order of cosmos, the rational order of the mind and the linguistic ability to communicate thoughts to others.[28]
As Dennis Sweet puts it, “for Heraclitus, the person with wisdom understands the underlying, unitary structure of the Logos”[29] and acknowledges that “all things are one”. Following Sweet’s interpretation, we are explained that because nature is self-concealing[30], the majority of people are blind to the rational structure of the Universe, being captives within their own limits of understanding. Although Heraclitus declares himself to be an empiricist, and thus the epistemological knowledge originates in senses, he also emphasizes the importance of reason[31]. One remark has to be made on the fragments 101[32] and 107[33]: listening is associated to logos in the sense of a spoken word, statement, and discourse whereas in the case of seeing, Heraclitus establishes a relationship to the cognitive verbs. The perfect tense of the Greek verb eido (‘to see’) is oida, which literally translate means ‘I have seen’, but which was used to mean ‘I know’.[34] This observation is of significant importance to the analysis of the study made by Heidegger and Fink.
2. The Heidegger-Fink interpretation
The traditional interpretation may represent the onset for the additional, Heidegger-Fink interpretation. If the traditional analysis of Heraclitus is founded upon comparisons and antitheses (Heraclitus being contrasted to Parmenides, or to the openness to the society of the philosopher, or the understanding of his philosophy through opposite concepts), the Heidegger-Fink seminar inquires into Heraclitus, through the scope of the hermeneutical circle, i.e. significant fragments are re-translated and re-analyzed individually, and then looked at through the context created by the sum of the fragments. Reiterating the role of seeing in Heraclitus, the blindness of humans is one of Heraclitus' main themes and this argument will be tangentially treated in the interpretation of fragment 64, which is the vantage point of the Heidegger-Fink seminar:
“Lightning steers the universe.”[35]
Heidegger is aware of the philological problematic issued by the context of the Church Father Hippolytus and the possible alteration of the fragment above, and, therefore he seeks common ground between pure philology and extreme, undisciplined philosophical assumption. Added to these circumstances the fact that he is displeased with the Hermann Diels’ translation, Heidegger re-translates the fragment.[36] “τὰ πάντα”, emphasizes Heidegger, is better translated as “all the things”, rather than “universe”. In order to support his argument and also to give better account of the concept “τὰ πάντα”, Heidegger juxtaposes fragment 41:
“The wise is one thing only, to understand the thoughts that steer everything through everything”.[37]
The stress in the fragment above is laid upon “ἓν τὸ σοφόν” (the wise thing in one thing only) “πάντα διὰ πάντων” (“everything through everything”). Fink and Heidegger attempt to relate “ἓν τὸ σοφόν” to logos, while “πάντα διὰ πάντων” is related to Being. Wisdom is thus connected to the intelligibility of logos. Heidegger distinguishes between “τὰ πάντα” and “πάντα διὰ πάντων”. On this account, “πάντα διὰ πάντων” is translated as Being, unitary and all encompassing being, while “τὰ πάντα” represent everything as a sum of individual things (or entities). Fink states that in fragment 64, “τὰ πάντα” does not mean a calm static multiplicity, but rather a dynamic multiplicity of entities.[38] In fragment 64, the lightning, can be assimilated to fire, which is traditionally associated to change. In addition, Fragment 1 is set side by side to the previous two:
“Though this Logos is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though everything come into being in accordance with this Logos, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it is what it is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep.”[39]
Heidegger focuses on “γίγνονται” (“coming into being”) because of its indicative value to movement. In addition, he artificially introduces the concept “γένεσις” (genesis), which is not conceptualized in Heraclitus.[40] Doing so, Heidegger desires to establish the proper meaning “γίγνονται” in this context, and that is “γένεσις”, as understood through the biblical scope. Heidegger, wants to say that, in fact of the text, “γίγνονται”, has two meanings: one of coming into being and the other of creation and they should be distinguished one of another. This distinction can be made clear by juxtaposing “γίγνονται” to “πάντα διὰ πάντων” and “τὰ πάντα” to “γένεσις”.
Having gathered all these hypotheses together, it is possible converge them towards a synthetic rendering of their meaning. Heidegger and Fink associate to the steering of the lightning the idea of movement inside Being. Lightning brightens for a moment τὰ πάντα, thus, outlining in their features, a infinity of entities. Lightning (or fire) is the agent of differentiation between entities (beings) within the all encompassing Being. Therefore, movement and lightning are the causal agencies for
coming forth into appearance[41]. Fink explains:
“Coming forth to appearance, where you see in Greek the meaning of γίγνονται as thought in “γένεσις”, then we also have a reference to the brightness and gleam of lightning in which the individual thing stands and flashes up.“[42]
In other words, the flux (or movement) of beings is a constant within Being itself, and this flux is administrated by fire (or lightning). What comes into appearance is not Being, understood as ever-changing, but the entities within Being are steered in such a way that they come into appearance as plural.
Examining fragment 41, a link between wisdom, thought and logos can be established. This fragment refers to “πάντα διὰ πάντων”, i.e. the all encompassing Being. One must emphasize here the singular aspect of “ἓν τὸ σοφόν” and then assimilate it to the singularity of the logos. Logos represents here the unique intelligible law of the Universe, and consequently, the law (wisdom) of the Being. As Being is the sum of beings (entities), Logos is the sum of thoughts of particular, individual laws derived from Logos itself. These “thoughts”, conceived as laws steer or move “πάντα διὰ πάντων”. This claim should not be understood that Being itself is moved by some particular laws. The argument for the previous observation lies within the first fragment: logos and Being are ever-existent, inasmuch there is no causal agency for their existence. According to the logos, seen as a law-codex, split into a plurality of particular laws, Being, “πάντα διὰ πάντων” is inwardly put to motion, by these particular laws which dictate the flux of entities, .
One last observation deserves to be reflected upon: under the setting of fragments above, Heidegger and Fink attempt a phenomenological turn of Heraclitus ontology. In the first fragment, Heraclitus touches on “the experience of men”, which have caused him so much contempt for his fellow citizens, represents the cause of human obliviousness. The appearances teach us that “τὰ πάντα” is indeed in motion, in flux, as a phenomenon of “πάντα διὰ πάντων” under the inclination of the logos.
3. Conclusion
The traditional interpretation of Heraclitus constitutes the background for the Heidegger-Fink seminar. There is a perceptible opposition between the two, but nevertheless, the latter interpretation derives from the presuppositions of the former. Heidegger and Fink attempt a deeper interpretation of Heraclitus’ cryptic texts, and by the end of this analysis, we have already noticed that the traditional interpretation treats Heraclitus narrowly. The purpose of the traditional interpretation is to offer an overview, an outline of Heraclitus’ philosophy, merely in an encyclopedic fashion. However, the analysis of these texts has to match in depth the profoundness of the philosopher; otherwise, a shallow examination can point us to delusive conclusions. For example, the traditional interpretation claims that everything is in flux, resulting in more than a divergent point of view to the one of Parmenides, to whom Heraclitus is traditionally contrasted. From Heidegger’s and Fink’s point of view, we can assume that Parmenides’ and Heraclitus’ ontologies are rather convergent. At the opposite end, we must be prudent of how much we assume because one cannot ever be sufficiently diligent when dealing with these matters. It would be an act of great arrogance, delusion and superlative self-confidence to believe that I have been able to thoroughly resolve such matters. The question concerning the relationship between justification and certainty is of epistemological kind, and, although not referred here, it might entangle additional difficulties in the interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragments.
[1] The history of philosophy is the open-ended history of building cities of thought. Philosophizing is the act of bringing ideas together, in an orderly manner, thus building coherent judgments starting from individual ideas. The beginning of philosophy corresponds to the primary layering of initial bricks of thoughts, in Ancient Greece. Today, if we try to interact with the original texts of the Pre-Socratics, we perceive that the fundament is frail, but the ancient philosophers had a more direct access to these sources, i.e. they had access to the original unspoiled texts. I want to emphasize that post-Pre-Socratic philosophy did not consolidate on a meagre groundwork. It may seem to us that the ground structure is weak but the Pre-Socratic thought unveils itself today as a collection of adamantine pillars which sustain the entire structure of current philosophy. I refer to the recursive evolution of philosophical thought, where new judgments emerge successively from previous ideas, and where old ideas and thoughts tend to be forgotten, without permanent reiteration.
[2] The primary philosophical questions seem to have disappeared from the current philosophical agenda. As every tyro in the philosophical sphere, I am preoccupied with the perennial, basic questions which have not been answered yet. I believe that these basic questions need to be recurrently reiterated in order be reminded the origins of all philosophical inquiry.
[3] I am assured that what I see (understand) are phenomena, but the question here is if these phenomena can be assimilated to noumena (things-in-themselves, true account of reality).
[4] A generally accepted collection of Pre-Socratic fragments is the opus magnum of Hermann Diels – Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, where he brought together fragments attributed to the Pre-Socratics from secondary sources. The fragments belonging to Heraclitus are cited from works of Diogenes Laertius, Strabo, Aristotle, Plato, Simplicius etc., and we are unsure whether the citers misused Heraclitean thought in order to prove their thesis.
[6] Plato wrote in Cratylus: “Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to the Heraclitus’ opinion, that all things flow and nothing stands.”
[7] The seminar took place at Freiburg University during the winter semester of 1966/67 and it was supervised by Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink.
[8] I believe that, under the circumstances derived from the scarcity of original Heraclitus’ texts, one standard interpretation is insufficient, no matter how adequate this one interpretation may seem. In addition, I do not propose an ambivalent understanding of Heraclitus, but rather a dualistic one, where one interpretation complements the other one.
[9] Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers (9.1). Fragment 121: “The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermodoros, the best man among them, saying: « We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among others.»”
[10] Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers (9.1):"Heraclitus son of Bloson (or, according to some, of Herakon) of Ephesus. The man was in his prime [acme] in the 69th Olympiad. He grew up to be exceptionally haughty and supercilious, as is clear also from his book, in which he says: "Learning of many things does not teach intelligence; if so it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus." Finally he became a misanthrope, withdrew from the world, and lived in the mountains feeing on grasses and plants. However, having fallen in this way into a dropsy he came down to town and asked the doctors in a riddle if they could make a drought out of rainy weather. When they did not understand he buried himself in a cow-stall, expecting that the dropsy would be evaporated off by the heat of the manure; but even so he failed to effect anything, and ended his life at the age of sixty."
[11] Seneca, Lucius Annaeus; John M. Cooper & J.F. Procopé (translators) (1995). Moral and Political Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 50 note 17.
[18] Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers . Socrates (22). Socrates testifies for Heraclitus’ obscure sagacity: “The concepts I understand are great, but I believe that the concepts I cant understand are great too. However, the reader needs to be an excellent swimmer like those from Dilos, so not to be drown from his book”.
[19] Gadamer, G. 2002. The Beginning of Knowledge. “Heraclitus remains a constant challenge for every kind of thinking. Men like Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger meet his challenge in fundamentally different ways. Countless pages of philological commentary on Heraclitus have been produced. But what was valid for antiquity still seems valid today. He is still the dark one. There is no single fundamental perspective that allows us to grasp this figure shimmering between moralisms and metaphysics.
[21] Hamlyn D.H. 1987. The Penguin History of Western Philosophy. Penguin Books. pp. 19. “Heraclitus had one disciple, Cratylus who seems to have adopted a more extreme version of his master’s views.”
[23] Fragment 50 from Hippolytus, Refutation (9.9.1)
[33] Fragment 107: “Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, if they have souls that understand not their language.”
[34] Idem 25. pp. 69
[35] Fragment 64 from Hippolytus, Refutation (9.10.7) .”τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίξει Κεραυνός”. The texts of citation are taken from Hermann Diels opus magnum, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, published in 1906.
[37] Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers (9.1). Fragment 41: “εἶναι γὰρ ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυϐέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων.”
[39] Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos. 7. 132: “(τοῦ δὲ) λόγου τοῦδʹ ἐόντος (ἀεὶ) ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ (πάντων) κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι διαιρέων ἕκαστον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἔγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.”
[41] “Zum-Vorschein-Komen”, Idem 36, pp. 9
