Comments on Mind, Self and Society written by George H. Mead

Sinopsis 1

Somewhere in the subchapter Self, Mead questions whether mind is successive to language. He gives an example, to some extent biblical and to other reminding of suricate families.

He says that each herd has a sentinel. In case of danger, the sentinel will start running quicker than the rest of the heard; the others will automatically begin to run and to follow with the virtue of a herd.  Mead asses that at the time the sentinel announces danger and begins to run and the others to follow, there is no mental process involved, only a particular social stimulus. As stated before, when someone shouts fire, the same impetus to run would arouse within himself. The sentinel does not regards himself  as to be supposed to launch a signal; the primary signal that generated the run of the heard is repeated onto the sentinel. Mead emphasizes that subjective process of the sentinel by answering to his own stimulus is one of internalization through which the individual assimilates the entire social into his own conduct. Further on, Mead assesses that the content of the mind is only the product and development of social interaction.  The intelligence seems to be arisen through the internalization of social processes of experience and behaviour.  Mead argues that this internalization has become possible only through language (i.e. communication) and as a result it is legitimate to assess that the stages of development of language must be situated prior to those of the development of mind and thought.

Commentary 1

I cannot entertain the idea that the sentinel first starts to run and then it realizes why he is running  from. Furthermore, I do not think that is justified to believe in such general terms, that people react to the siren of danger in the fashion described beforehand. Whatever the alarm would be there is a chance that people will not follow, nor react to signal. In addition, in order to be able to identify the danger the sentinel must have a prior cognition of that particular danger. Mead fails to explain whether that cognition is acquired by internalization of a social behaviour. We might avoid dangers because there is a certain social behaviour against meeting a certain behaviour, but in certain circumstances, where the general social knowledge about a certain event is absent we can evaluate the potentiality of danger sensuously, by experiencing it, or by following certain general guidelines or patterns. If we experience that particular event, how can it be said that consecutive experiences like thought and mind would solely be regulated by the internalization of a certain social behaviour?